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### TALKING POINTS ON SOVIET/CUBAN OPTIONS

ī.	More	forei	gners?
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desian Map)

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- 1. 10,000 Cubans/Ethiopians to Mozambique
- 2. "No intention at this time"
- B. Contingency planning?

#### II. It is:

A.

- A. Conceivable several thousand Cubans in Mozambique. Not\_for invasion
  - B. Likely more Soviets/Cubans into Mozambique/Zambia
  - C. Almost certain general increase in Soviet/Cuban activity
  - -Force size depends on circumstances. 2-10 thousand are enough. Smaller numbers = Smaller shock
  - -Higher figure feed in gradually. Fewer political/logistical problems

#### III. Pressures/Risks

- Jers Graphic) A. FLS don't like foreign involvement
  - 1. Want African victory
  - 2. Fewer Soviets/Cubans the better
  - 3. Sudden increase South Africa joins Rhodesia
  - B. Time may change FLS attitudes
  - C. Nkomo needs early settlement
    - 1. Long campaign military restive
    - Can't save forces & stay effective
    - 3. Kaunda taking heat
  - D. Mugabe most fighting
    - 1. Needs more protection
    - 2. Reduce time for Nkomo/Smith talks
    - 3. After Smith needs better trained forces ZANU training in Ethiopia

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- 1. Can't defend against Rhodesians
- Nyerere/Neto want to move on other matters
- F. Soviets/Cubans may accept risks
  - 1. To increase presence. Better footing
  - Believe on winning side
  - Make situation more favorable to Soviets
  - 4. Can project military power
  - 5. Incentive. Pull Cubans from Ethiopia. No go home
- G. Biggest risk South African intervention
  - 1. Rhodesians have only:
    - -12,000 troops, 6,000 mobilizable

    - -36 MIG-17 equivalent aircraft
  - 2. But South Africans:
    - -45,000 troops, 250,000 mobilizable

    - -3 SS, 3 DE, other minor combatants
- IV. If sent, mission is...
  - A. Most likely show-the-flag
    - 1. Diplomatic weight against Smith
    - 2. Deter Rhodesia
  - Probably defend against Rhodesians
  - Possibly train/advise guerrillas
  - Least likely Invade now. Later, maybe. Invasion logistics

(Air Routes Map)

1. Soviets can do their part

(LOC's Map)

- 2. LOC's comparable to Angola/Ethiopia-adequate
- Mechanized suitability?

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a. Border crossings limited

(Zambia-Rhodesia Border

(1) Zambia - 3 points

Map)

(Mozambique-Rhodesia Border

(2) Mozambique - mountains & jungle

desia Movement Map)

b. Rhodesia - suitable

(Rhodesia-South Africa Border Map) c. South African access - suitable

V. Seriously doubt large force intent on invasion - now.

-Expect sustained increase in Soviet/Cuban presence

-Assessments may change as situation unfolds.

-3-

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